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INTRODUCTION 
The “it” of the foregoing quote was the transatlantic telegraph, being 
described by the mayor of New York City in 1858. Yet the same words 
could equally be applied to the significance of social media platforms and 
their transformative impact on the world. From its humble beginnings in 
2004 as a way for Harvard students to stay connected with one another, 
Facebook’s inexorable spread has resulted in the most-visited website in the 
world and nearly 1 billion users worldwide. Twitter, which processed 
roughly 5,000 “tweets” per day in 2007, now handles over 340 million 
tweets each day. The rise of social media represents a paradigm shift in how 
people communicate and share information, and it is only natural that social 
media play an ever-increasing role in stimulating political debate and 
galvanizing support for or opposition to governmental policies and the 
figures identified with them. 
Nowhere has this impact been more evident than in what has become 
known as the “Arab Spring,” a term applied to the social unrest and political 
upheaval that spilled across the Middle East in early 2011, beginning with 
Tunisia and continuing across Egypt and into Yemen, leaving authoritarian 
governments toppled in its wake. Rather than provide a recitation of events 
that have already been well-documented in the media, this article will first 
examine the debate over the role played by social media in bringing about 
the Arab Spring. A number of commenters have argued that this role has 
been grossly overstated—that, in essence, dictators are overthrown by 
people, not by social media platforms. But there is compelling empirical 
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evidence to suggest that, if anything, social media’s importance may have 
been understated. Next, this article will attempt to place social media’s 
contribution to the Arab Spring in perspective, by analyzing how emerging 
technologies are impacting not only political and social protest in other 
nations, but also affecting diplomatic efforts and governmental response as 
well. Even in a democratic nation like Great Britain, an event like the 
London riots illustrates the powerful temptation for governmental response 
to incorporate censorship and even cutting off access to the Internet. Finally, 
this article will examine the use of technology in government response, and 
how the “unplugging of democracy” as a state media strategy can result in 
the very same communications platforms that galvanize political protest 
movements being used to stifle such expression—often with the aid of 
Western technology companies. 
In the digital age, the power of social media to, nearly instantaneously, 
spread word of atrocities, inflame public opinion, and to embolden people to 
take action can no longer be underestimated, and neither can what that 
means for traditional diplomatic efforts. The acceleration of media has 
steadily meant changes to diplomatic channels. President Kennedy, for 
example, had plenty of time to formulate a response to the Soviet Union’s 
Berlin Wall crackdown. Yet by the latter stages of the Vietnam War, 
President Johnson was frustrated by the increasing technological 
capabilities of television news as it offered an alternate version of wartime 
events. And the diplomatic prominence of cable news was perhaps never 
more important than during the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein let CNN 
stay in place as a diplomatic channel to Washington. However, despite this 
media acceleration, the Obama administration (that itself owed a measure of 
its campaign success to its mastery of social media) was little more than a 
sideline player, diplomatically speaking, during the Arab Spring. As Philip 
Seib has pointed out, “Policy makers cannot be mere spectators. Stunned 
surprise is an inadequate response to transformative events, and yet that is 
what we saw from the United States and other major powers as events in the 
Arab world unfolded.”1 
Both the use of social media platforms by citizens to organize protests 
and the governmental response of attempting to control, limit, or completely 
shut down such technologies will continue to pose important questions for 
international law scholars for years to come, even as democracies ponder 
limits on Internet access. For example, in an age in which social media can 
influence outcomes in mere days, how can nations effectively and 
meaningfully conduct diplomacy? How do the laws of war affect civilians’ 
use of social media to guide military air strikes, as in Libya? Even though 
revolutions were toppling governments long before Facebook and Twitter, 
and even though social media-coordinated political expression has not 
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always led to regime change (witness the 2009 Iranian election protests), the 
Arab Spring has provided perhaps provided the clearest example of how the 
power of social media platforms can be harnessed as a tool for political 
organization and expression. 
I. THE ARAB SPRING IN PERSPECTIVE 
Few people could have predicted the role that a humble produce vendor, 
Mohamed Bouazizi, would play in unleashing a wave of protests seeking 
democracy across the Arab world. After being assessed an arbitrary fine, 
slapped by corrupt policemen, and humiliated in public, the young Tunisian 
stepped in front of a Tunisian government building on December 17, 2010, 
and set himself on fire. Video of the horrific event went viral in Tunisia, 
which enjoys one of the highest rates of Internet access in north Africa. 
Within a month, there were over 196,000 mentions on Twitter about the 
Tunisian revolution, and after increasing protests, the government of 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was toppled. 
Civil war broke out in Libya. Protestors took to the streets in Yemen, 
Syria (where a civil war would also soon begin), Bahrain, Morocco, and 
elsewhere. In Egypt in 2010, Khaled Said was beaten and murdered by 
Egyptian police after he posted a video showing police corruption online. 
Photos of Said and his swollen, bruised face went viral on the Internet, 
contradicting police reports and an official autopsy report that had 
concluded that Said had choked to death on a bag of drugs. Wael Ghonim, 
and Egyptian Google executive and Internet activist, started a Facebook 
page entitled “We Are All Khaled Said.” It grew to over 800,000 members, 
as Egyptians increasingly used social networking platforms to produce and 
consume political content, organize protests, stay connected, and spread 
word to others about abuses of the Mubarak regime. 
While the success of the so-called “Facebook revolutions” or “Twitter 
revolutions” during the Arab Spring garnered worldwide attention- 
technology and, particularly social media, played significant roles in 
mobilizing and organizing political and social protests worldwide. On 
January 17, 2001, after Filipino President Joseph Estrada was acquitted of 
corruption charges, within minutes after the decision was announced, people 
took to their mobile phones to forward text messages. The messages called 
for people to converge on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a major 
crossroads in Manila. Over 1 million people eventually arrived, stopping 
traffic in downtown Manila. Nearly 7 million text messages were sent 
protesting the verdict. Legislators quickly reversed course and allowed key 
evidence that had been set aside to be introduced. By January 20, President 
Estrada was out, and he himself blamed “the text messaging generation” for 
his downfall. 
All over the world, the power of social networking as a tool for effecting 
political change has been played out on stages that may not be as prominent 
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as Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring, but which nonetheless command 
our attention. In India, the government has demanded that social media sites 
like Facebook censor user content to remove objectionable content before it 
goes online. Sites like Facebook and Google/Orkut are already being 
monitored by special units in cities like Mumbai for content deemed 
disparaging or obscene. In South Korea, prosecutors indicted a Socialist 
Party member for re-tweeting pro-North Korean messages from a North 
Korean government Twitter account. In China, which has waged its own 
war with social networking sites over its censorship demands, the 
government was upset with the fact that the U.S. Embassy posted air 
pollution reading in Beijing on Twitter. The readings, which rebuke the 
official and wildly optimistic assessments of the Chinese government, have 
been picked up and spread by Chinese bloggers as an indication of the 
government’s lack of transparency and willingness to lie to its own people. 
In October 2011, the office of U.S. Senator Richard Lugar released a report 
outlining a strategy to advance U.S. goals in Latin America by expanding 
social media use and by supporting software engineering training programs, 
IT literacy programs, and supporting local technology developers in 
creating language translation programs (only about 12% of Internet content 
is in Spanish or Portuguese). In addition, the U.S. State Department is 
already using social media to reach out and to explain U.S. foreign policy, 
through tools like Iniciacion Emprende, a Facebook page for online youth in 
Latin America who are interested in starting their own businesses. 
Ongoing developments in Russia have also illustrated the vital role 
played by social media in fomenting dissent. In December 2011, tens of 
thousands of Russians protested in cities like Moscow, organizing anti-Putin 
rallies using social networking sites. YouTube was flooded with videos 
alleging vote rigging by the countries’ ruling United Russia Party. Russia 
has over 1 million Twitter users, a five-fold increase from the previous year. 
40% of Russian adults are online, using sites like Vkontakte (Russia’s 
“Facebook”). 
Governmental response that uses technology or directly addresses the use 
of technology by protestors is a key factor in the success or failure of 
movements agitating for political or social change, as the experience of the 
Arab Spring amply demonstrates. However, social media is a double-edged 
sword. During the August 2011 London riots, social networking platforms 
received much of the blame for providing rioters with a vehicle to help 
organize and cause massive, violent looting. Rioting Londoners used social 
media not only to plan rendezvous locations, but also to warn others of 
areas where the police had gathered in force. At one point, the Metropolitan 
Police announced that they would bring charges against people who tried to 
initiate looting or violence through social media postings. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the riots, individuals who had used social media to coordinate 
looting or to incite violence were criminally charged. Even Prime Minister 
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David Cameron raised the stakes during the unrest, when he publicly 
contemplated shutting down access to the Internet. 
Yet, even as social media became associated with the violence and 
lawlessness of the London riots, it was simultaneously a positive force. 
Social media aided the police in finding, apprehending, and prosecuting 
thousands of suspected rioters and looters in the wake of the unrest. In 
addition, social media helped facilitate a massive cleanup effort and helped 
a divided community to heal. Facebook pages and websites were created to 
help coordinate and centralize information about cleanup locations. In 
addition, @Riotcleanup, a popular Twitter feed with over 60,000 followers, 
was created and regularly updated to let people know where to meet to help 
clean up the city, donate supplies, and so forth. 
Social networking platforms are all about facilitating communication and 
the sharing of information. These new methods of communication allow 
widely-dispersed individuals to connect and work together in a coordinated 
fashion, while also broadcasting their views and activities at home and 
abroad. The Arab Spring experience was but one demonstration among 
many on the international landscape. It is a virtual certainty that it will not 
be the last. 
II. WAS THE REVOLUTION REALLY TWEETED? 
As the Arab Spring coalesced, media outlets worldwide clamored to 
credit the use of social networking platforms for the regime-changing 
successes. One account quoted on a tweeting Cairo activist who proclaimed 
“[w]e use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to co-ordinate and 
YouTube to tell the world.”2 At times, the effusiveness of the protestors 
themselves veered into the extreme; in February 2011, Jamal Ibrahim of 
Egypt even named his newborn daughter “Facebook” because of the 
significant role of the social networking site in his country’s revolution.3 
Other observers similarly applauded the importance of social media. Amjad 
Baiazy of Amnesty International said that during Syria’s crackdown on 
dissidents, for example, there were “thousands of [pieces of] evidence 
thanks to social media, not only to show the world, but also Syrians, of the 
crimes.”4 Social media, Baiazy said, had “turned every citizen into a 
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journalist. Every citizen can use Twitter to broadcast.”5 The Atlantic Wire 
quoted Mohammed Janjoom of CNN on the vital role played by social 
media, with Janjoom pointing out: 
In the case of Egypt it really played a critical factor in getting out the word 
on how to organize . . . . There was one group in Egypt that was one of the 
key groups in getting people out on the street . . . . Last week in a matter of 
days they went from 20,000 fans to 80,000 fans . . . . We can see that these 
sites were used in order to get the word out about how to bypass 
checkpoints, how to get across bridges, how to get to places where people 
wanted to demonstrate. So it was a critical tool in getting people out into 
the streets.6 
Other observers pointed to the organizational value as well as the 
empowering, citizen journalism aspect of social media: 
Regardless of one’s personal opinion of YouTube, Twitter and Facebook, 
these social media platforms, along with sheer creativity, determination 
and innovation, became the technological weapons of this revolution. 
Their use confounded the Mubarak team at every turn as tech savvy people 
around the globe created the means with which to continue to get their 
messages out . . . . While many who were there in the Square argued 
Twitter and Facebook were not great organising tools for those physically 
there, they provided a tipping point of outrage that spread like wildfire 
throughout the region . . . . Yes, everyone knew to go to Tahrir Square . . . 
these social media tools were used to send out information quickly so 
evidence of regime atrocities were seen from places the media’s cameras 
were not able to show the violence.7 
Moreover, as Denis Campbell went on to observe, the use of social 
networking platforms lent an air of honesty and transparency to coverage of 
the revolution, highlighting the use of candid, unguarded moments from 
Tahrir Square “of children protesting and spontaneous groups singing, 
virally across the globe countering biased coverage that painted the 
revolution as not meaningful or only representative of a small group of 
protestors.”8 
Yet almost as quickly as the coverage and credit—misplaced or not—
being given to social media occurred, a backlash began against those media 
accounts that had, as one author described it, “glazed over what the real role 
of social media was, instead mischaracterizing social media and the Internet 
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as a new phenomenon that showed Egyptian youth just how wonderful 
democracy was.”9 A host of pundits sprang up to argue that social media 
was merely a means and not the end, and that Western journalists were 
engaging in considerable wishful thinking, exaggerating the influence of 
emerging media because of a sense of “techno-utopianism.” Pointing out the 
failure of Iran’s 2009 election protests amidst the media hype about the 
power of social media, for example, Evgeny Morozov wrote that “Iran’s 
Twitter Revolution revealed the intense Western longing for a world where 
information technology is the liberator rather than the oppressor.”10 Writing 
in the Washington Post, Anne Applebaum expressed her skepticism based 
on the continued Egyptian protests even after President Mubarak decided to 
cut off all Internet access: 
Note that the Egyptian government’s decision to shut down the country’s 
Internet access over the weekend—something it can do because Internet 
access is still so limited—had almost no impact on the demonstrators. For 
all the guff being spoken about Twitter and social media, the uprising in 
Cairo appears to be a very old-fashioned, almost 19th century revolution. 
People see other people going out on the streets and decide to join them.11 
Such critics were quick to point out that while social networking 
platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between 
popular will and political authority, ultimately there is no substitute for 
word of mouth and boots on the ground activism. Sites like Facebook or 
Twitter may be useful tools for rapid coordination, but don’t look to them 
for the narrative or resolve needed to sustain a movement. As Andrew 
Woods commented in one op-ed piece, “flash mobs do not a political 
organization make.”12 
Soon, almost as if to compensate for the pendulum swing of media 
commentary that had been hailing “the Twitter Revolution” in the Mideast 
and arguably magnifying social media’s role in the political upheaval, the 
pendulum swung back. Articles begin appearing with such titles as 
“Successful Revolution Takes More Than Social Media,” “Did Twitter, 
Facebook Really Build a Revolution?,” and “The Twitter Revolution 
Debate is Dead.”13 And new attention was focused on earlier cynics, like 
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Golnaz Esfandiari’s refutation of the role that social media had played in the 
2009 unrest in Iran. Writing in Foreign Policy, Esfandiari said “It is time to 
get Twitter’s role in the events in Iran right. Simply put: There was no 
Twitter Revolution inside Iran.” Instead, Esfandiari pointed out, it was 
Western journalists and bloggers who were scrolling through English-
language tweets with the hashtag “#iranelection,” rather than 
communicating with people on the ground in Iran, who were spreading 
word of the unrest. Nevertheless, despite the confusion over the sources of 
the news itself, Esfandiari acknowledged that social media played a pivotal 
role in publicizing the Iranian protests, albeit a role that had to be viewed in 
the context of the efforts at regime change that predated social media. 
Esfandiari noted: 
Twitter played an important role in getting word about the events in Iran 
out to the wider world. Together with YouTube, it helped focus the 
world’s attention on the Iranian people’s fight for democracy and human 
rights. New media over the last year created and sustained unprecedented 
international moral solidarity with the Iranian struggle—a struggle that 
was being bravely waged many years before Twitter was ever conceived.14 
Perhaps the most vocal member of the “Internet freedom does not equate 
with securing real freedom” school of thought is Malcolm Gladwell. 
Rejecting the idea that the “new tools of social media have reinvented social 
activism,” Gladwell pointed to the success of the early sit-ins during the 
U.S. civil rights movement to illustrate that meaningful social change could 
be accomplished with word of mouth instead of technology.15 As Gladwell 
put it, “These events in the early sixties became a civil-rights war that 
engulfed the South for the rest of the decade—and it happened without e-
mail, texting, Facebook, or Twitter.”16 Gladwell continued to sound this 
theme in the aftermath of the toppling of the Mubarak regime, writing 
“What evidence is there that social revolutions in the pre-Internet era 
suffered from a lack of cutting-edge communications and organizational 
  
World/Global-Issues/2011/0630/Social-media-Did-Twitter-and-Facebook-really-build-a-
global-revolution; James Fellows & Ellen Chou, The Twitter Revolution Debate is Dead, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2011, 1:00 AM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2011/02/the-twitter-revolution-debate-is-dead/71185/; Golnaz Esfandiari, 
The Twitter Devolution, FOREIGN POLICY (June 7, 2010), http://www. 
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt.  
 14.  Id. 
 15. Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/ 
101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
 16.  Id. 
2013] Democracy Unplugged 71 
tools? In other words, did social media solve a problem that actually needed 
solving?17 
Certainly, political and social protests have gone on long before social 
media, and dictators were being toppled long before the first glimmers of 
Facebook or Twitter. And without a doubt, Western journalists in a rush to 
anoint social networking as the new “it” tool to effect social change may 
have been guilty, if not of overstating social media’s role in the Arab 
Spring, then of failing to properly place it in the context of other 
organizational and broadcast tools. Viewing it more pragmatically, one 
commentator has noted that Egyptians “knew the value of social media was 
that it was a good tool to organize masses but it was not a miracle object 
that would create a revolution on its own. With that understanding, they 
used both the Internet and clandestine meetings to shape the revolution.18 
However, cyber-pessimists like Gladwell and others, in their rush to 
assure and convince their respective audiences that “the revolution will not 
be tweeted,” have failed to take several significant factors into account. The 
first is that a failure to appreciate the significance of the role played by 
social media in organizing protests, broadcasting word of the dissenting 
voices, and promoting government transparency during the Arab Spring is 
at once dismissive as well of the social networking power that can be (and 
has been) harnessed by repressive regimes themselves for their own 
purposes—surveillance of the opposition, spreading disinformation, and 
even networking propaganda of their own. The second factor that cyber-
pessimists have ignored hearkens back to Marshall McCluhan’s prophetic 
words that “the medium is the message.” The medium carrying the message, 
whether it be Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or any one of a number of social 
networking platforms, cannot help but define and shape the message itself. 
The utility of a site like Facebook is in providing a tool for enhancing the 
ability to engage in public speech, to undertake collective action, and to 
facilitate instantaneous access to information, communication, and 
organization. Social media didn’t bring about the protests in Tahrir Square; 
these were fueled by years of corruption, poverty, unemployment, and the 
abuses of an authoritarian regime. Yet just because social mobilization 
occurs via Facebook or Twitter as opposed to face to face communication 
doesn’t lessen its impact or make the ties it creates any weaker. Images of 
friends and neighbors being beaten by riot police are powerful, and clearly 
can draw people to the streets. The appeals for solidarity, the calls to action, 
are no less powerful because they are viewed in a hastily-recorded YouTube 
clip as opposed to being witnessed in person. The very immediacy of social 
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media and the technological infrastructure it provided for gathering and 
organizing support, together with the transparency it offered by providing a 
global audience with news is as much a part of the message as the content 
itself. 
The final factor overlooked by cyber-pessimists in the backlash seeking 
to diminish the importance of social media’s role during the Arab Spring is 
the growing body of empirical evidence that has emerged to document 
social media’s critical importance in enabling the historic region-wide 
uprising in early 2011. For example, a study by Ekaterina Stepanova of the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations analyzed the 
penetration rate of modern information communication technologies and 
digital social media tools and networks throughout the Middle East in late 
2010 and early 2011.19 While that report chided media haste to emphasize 
the mobilization role of a site like Twitter, for example, as composed to the 
greater impact of satellite television, cell phones, and YouTube, it 
nevertheless concluded: 
No region, state, or form of government can remain immune to the impact 
of new information and communication technologies on social and 
political movements. While the political contexts of mass unrest in large 
parts of the Middle East have important country and macro-regional 
specifics, the impact of net-based technologies and social tools goes 
beyond that region and will continue to affect developing and developed 
countries alike.20 
The PONARS report highlights the conditions that made it possible for 
social media to play such an important role in Egypt, relying upon February 
2010 figures from the Egyptian Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology that revealed that the country had over 17 million 
users—a 3,691 percent increase from the 450,000 users it had in December 
2000.21 According to the Ministry, Egypt also had 4 million Facebook users 
at the time, and over 160,000 bloggers (roughly a third of which were 
focused on politics).22 Nevertheless, this PONARS report points out the 
seeming contradiction between its conclusions and the fact that “states with 
some of the lowest levels of Internet exposure (like Yemen and Libya) both 
experienced mass protests.”23 
Ultimately, the PONARS study cautions against U.S. policy making an 
automatic connection between social media networks and a Western-style 
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democracy agenda while ignoring socioeconomic realities and social justice 
facets to the Arab Spring. As Stepanova aptly characterizes it, the events of 
the Arab Spring defied skeptics like Malcom Gladwell and Evgeny 
Morozov by proving social media’s value as an accelerator of social 
transformation, but while “net-based information and communication tools 
may serve as powerful accelerating factors of social protest, . . . they do not 
in and of themselves reflect or dictate the substantive natures (sociopolitical, 
value-based, and ideological) and contextual forms of such protests.”24  
Another empirical look at the Arab Spring was conducted by the Dubai 
School of Government’s Governance and Innovation Program in its second 
Arab Social Media Report.25 The report highlights and analyzes usage 
trends of online social networking across the Arab region based on data 
collected during the first quarter of 2011, looking at (among other factors) 
Twitter and Facebook usage. In particular, it notes that Facebook usage 
between January and April 2011, jumped by 30 percent (compared with 18 
percent growth for the same time period in 2010). In particular, Egypt’s 
growth was 29 percent, up from just 12 percent for the first quarter of 
2010.26 The report also details the swelling numbers for terms on Twitter 
associated with the Arab Spring, noting that the hash tag “Egypt” garnered 
1.4 million references during the first quarter of 2011, while “Jan25” had 
1.2 million mentions.27 While the mentions associated with the Arab Spring 
in Tunisia peaked right around the January 14, 2011, when protests 
commenced there, such mentions in Egypt did not peak until President 
Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011.28 Another interesting fact 
from the study is that, for the Egyptians and Tunisians who were surveyed, 
government attempts to block sites like Facebook apparently backfired, with 
more than half of those surveyed (56% in Egypt, 59% in Tunisia) reporting 
the attempts had a positive effect by motivating them to be more creative in 
communicating and organizing.29 The study also mapped calls for protests 
on Facebook with the actual demonstrations on given dates and found 
demonstrable correlations. While the study stopped short of calling social 
networking “the defining or only factor in people organizing themselves on 
these dates,” it does conclude that, “as the initial platform for those calls, it 
cannot be denied that they were a factor in mobilizing movements.”30 
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Yet another telling result from the Arab Social Media Report concerns 
the significance of social media as a source of news and information. A 
staggering 94.29% of Tunisians surveyed reported getting their news and 
information on events during the civil unrest in early 2011 from social 
media resources like Facebook, Twitter, blogs, etc., while 88.10% of 
Egyptians acknowledged doing so.31 This dwarfs the figure for state-
sponsored media (television, radio, newspapers), which 35.71% of 
Egyptians and 40% of Tunisians admitted consulting.32 
Overall, while the Arab Social Media Report cautions that “[i]t is still 
early to make a final assessment about the role of social media in the Arab 
civil movements or the role they will be playing in changing the ways in 
which governments interact with societies in the region,” it nevertheless 
provides compelling empirical evidence suggesting that, as the report itself 
puts it, “the growth of social media in the region and the shift in usage 
trends have played a critical role in mobilization, empowerment, shaping 
opinions, and influencing change.”33 
A final example of the empirical analysis that refutes the media backlash 
against the recognition of social media’s vital role during the Arab Spring is 
the study performed by a group of University of Washington researchers as 
part of 2011’s Project on Information Technology and Political Islam.34 This 
study, which focused primarily on Tunisia and Egypt, involved the creation 
and study of a database consisting of more than 3 million tweets, gigabytes 
of blogs, and countless hours of YouTube videos. In discussing social 
media’s importance in putting “a human face on political oppression,” the 
study found that in Egypt, the number of tweets mentioning “revolution” 
from Egypt and during the week before President Mubarak’s resignation 
skyrocketed from 2,300 a day to 230,000 a day.35 Because Twitter users can 
send updates from any mobile phone, Professor Howard and his colleagues 
devoted particular attention to that data, since the number of people with 
cellphones in Egypt and Tunisia greatly outnumber those with standard 
internet access. As a result, Howard says, “Twitter offers us the clearest 
evidence of where individuals engaging in democratic conversations were 
located during the revolutions.”36 
Among the observations made in the University of Washington study is 
not just the sheer numbers indicating that political discussion on blogs and 
social networking platforms often preceded mass protests, but also the 
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“who” and “how” behind the social media efforts. Howard and his fellow 
researchers found that a key demographic group—young, urban, relatively 
well-educated individuals (many of whom were women)—played a critical 
role in steering the political conversation, and often in inventive ways.37 In 
Tunisia, for example, dissidents streamed video of President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali’s wife using a government jet to make expensive shopping 
trips to Europe to highlight the regime’s excesses.38 In addition, as with the 
Dubai School of Government’s Arab Social Media Report, the University of 
Washington study demonstrated that a spike in online conversations about 
revolutionary subjects usually preceded major events, with Twitter traffic 
peaking with street protests. 
Another interesting aspect of this study is not just the increasing social 
media activity and content produced by political actors in Egypt as they 
reacted to events on the street, but the close affinity with Western media. 
From mapping the digital space in Egypt twice (once in November 2010 
and a second time in May 2011), the University of Washington found that, 
for Egyptians, Facebook and other social networking platforms are not 
simply used for entertainment, but instead, are where Egyptians go to 
engage in politics. Major political actors frequently linked to social 
networking platforms like Facebook or to Western media (like CNN) and, 
in fact, were more likely to link to these resources than to each other.39 Over 
20% of the 928 links going out of Egyptian party websites were to social 
media platforms like Facebook and YouTube and to major Western news 
websites.40 Interestingly, none of the outgoing links from the Egyptian 
websites went to Al-Jazeera in November 2010, and when the web crawl 
was performed again in May 2011, there were only 6 outgoing links to Al-
Jazeera.41 
The University of Washington study relied on this body of empirical 
evidence to reach several conclusions. One was that, “by using digital 
technologies, democracy advocates created a freedom meme that took on a 
life of its own and spread ideas about liberty and revolution to a surprisingly 
large number of people.”42 Another was that conversations about democracy 
and revolution on blogs and social networking platforms usually 
immediately preceded mass protests.43 Finally, the report concluded that 
social media helped spread democratic ideas transnationally, as democracy 
proponents used social media to connect with others outside their borders. 
The result, according to Howard and his fellow researchers, was that “social 
media brought a cascade of messages about freedom and democracy across 
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North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise expectations for success 
of political uprising.”44 In other words, far from being merely an 
exaggeration by “cyber-utopian” Western media overly eager to anoint 
social media as a digital political savior, social networking platforms played 
a genuine, vital and, more importantly, quantifiable role in the Arab Spring. 
As Howard and his colleagues sagely point out: 
Democratization movements had existed long before technologies such as 
mobile phones and the Internet came to these countries. But technologies 
have helped people interested in democracy build extensive networks, 
create social capital, and organize political action. Technology may not 
have created the desire for political freedom, but it is a tool democracy 
advocates have used to their advantage.45 
III. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE 
As vital as appreciating the uses of social networking platforms by 
protesters themselves may be, no understanding of the significance of social 
media during the Arab Spring can be complete without appreciating the 
nature of the governmental response. In particular, the use of technology by 
repressive regimes—technology all too often developed and/or sold by 
Western nations—in attempting to stifle and combat dissent has been 
largely overlooked. Whether or not another Arab Spring might succeed 
could very well depend on how leaders in the West respond to attempts to 
“unplug democracy.” Legislative efforts such as the Global Online Freedom 
Act could impact the extent to which the very same technology credited 
with fomenting dissent can be used by an authoritarian regime to crush 
opposing voices. 
Looking at Egypt and Tunisia in particular, the conditions were certainly 
ripe for technology to serve as both a tool for marshaling and organizing 
protests and a means of exerting government control. Both countries have 
comparatively young populations comfortable with technology. In Tunisia, 
the median age is 30 years old, and approximately 23% of the country’s 
population of 10 million is under the age of 14.46 For every 100 people in 
Tunisia, there are 93 mobile phone subscribers.47 Twenty-five percent of the 
Tunisian population has used the Internet, and approximately 66% of the 
online population in Tunisia is 34 or younger.48 In Egypt, the median age is 
24, and out of the nation’s 83 million residents, a third is under the age of 
34.49 Out of 100 Egyptians, 67 have mobile phone subscriptions.50 Ten 
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percent of the Egyptian population has used the Internet, and 70% of the 
online population in Egypt is under the age of 34.51 And in both nations, 
there was a long history of government censorship of the media, giving 
people greater incentive to look to the Internet for sources of credible news 
and information. 
Prior to the Arab Spring itself, government crackdowns on Internet use, 
and particularly the use of social media, were not unknown. For example, in 
Tunisia in August 2007, video of the president’s plane arriving at and 
departing from prime shopping spots in Europe—with the president’s wife 
as the only passenger—was published on YouTube and other sites. The 
Tunisian government responded by blocking YouTube and another video 
site, Daily Motion, for an extended period of time.52 In 2008, the 
government blocked Facebook for a month.53 During both periods, it was 
widely speculated that the Tunisian administration of Ben Ali was 
concerned about the power of social media to nurture communication ties 
among its citizens. 
With the spark that ignited national protests in Tunisia—the self-
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010—came more 
crackdowns. Although the state-sponsored media had not covered either 
Bouazizi’s act, the protests it engendered, or his eventual death in a hospital 
on January 14, 2011, the uploaded YouTube videos of the tragedy spread 
rapidly, initially among networks of family and friends. Critics of the Ben 
Ali regime, like 29 year-old fashion designer Shamseddine Abidi, posted 
videos and updates on Facebook that were picked up by news outlets like Al 
Jazeera. At the same time, there were online campaigns calling for 
particular groups (like lawyers and unions) to form committees to support 
the protests that had begun in the city of Sidi Bouzid. While the Tunisian 
government responded by trying to ban Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
Daily Motion, organization using these social networking platforms had 
already spread thanks to the near-universal access to cell phones. In 
addition, outside Tunisia, hacker organizations like Anonymous targeted 
Tunisian government efforts with “Operation Tunisia” denial-of-service 
attacks and with software solutions that activists used to evade government 
firewalls.54 
The study by Professor Nolan and his colleagues show that Twitter 
traffic with hashtags associated with Tunisian protesters (such as 
#sidibouzid) ebbed and flowed along with government efforts to curb the 
effects of social media. Many of the tweets themselves gave glimpses into 
personal stories of suffering under the Ben Ali regime, while others 
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provided links to YouTube videos, news stories, or Facebook groups critical 
of the regime. Before Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14, 2011, the volume 
of Twitter traffic would periodically decline while mobile networks were 
under attack, but it would always surge again when service returned to 
normal.55 Similarly, the number of tweets coming from inside Tunisia 
increased over the same period, just as the number of tweets with no 
location information declined, an indication that as the winds of political 
change were blowing, more and more Tunisians were willing to publicly 
declare that they were tweeting from inside their own country.56 
As social media has become a key forum for the debate of political 
movements as well as an organizational tool for would-be reformers, 
governmental response has taken various forms, ranging from suppressing 
the use of such platforms, using them as an avenue for surveillance, or by 
blocking them altogether. In a study of thirty-seven countries conducted by 
Washington, D.C. based Freedom House, researchers identified a variety of 
different practices employed by governments, including increased website 
blocking and filtering; content manipulation; attacks upon and 
imprisonment of bloggers; punishment of ordinary users; and coercion of 
website owners to remove content.57 This study identified twelve nations, 
including Egypt and Tunisia, where social media sites have been at least 
temporarily shut down.58 Of the forms of governmental response to dissent 
being disseminated via social media, internet blocking is the most widely 
used. The aim of this response (essentially a form of censorship) is to 
prevent specific content from reaching a final user, using software or 
hardware that reviews communications and content and decides whether to 
block the information on the basis of some predetermined, pre-programmed 
criteria. 
Another widely used form of governmental response is coercion, or 
censorship by pressure. Here, governmental actors contact either the authors 
of particular information or the operators of an Internet site and apply 
pressure for the removal of particular content. This can take the form of 
threats of legal action, withdrawal of government contracts or licenses, or 
even outright bans of specific companies from operation within the country. 
One example of this is Google and China. In 2010, under immense pressure 
from the Chinese government to censor its content, Google China began 
redirecting all search queries from mainland-based Google.cn to 
Google.com.hk, based in Hong Kong. In this manner, Google could bypass 
Chinese regulatory authorities, allowing users access to uncensored search 
results as opposed to those that had been “simplified” by government filters. 
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As a unique entity acknowledged by international treaty, Hong Kong was 
not subject to Chinese laws requiring the restriction of the free flow of 
information. Governmental coercion can also take the form of encouraging 
users of social networking platforms like Facebook to complain directly to 
the site owners about user content. Content manipulation is another tactic in 
which government agents (portraying themselves as ordinary citizens) post 
pro-government messages or content on social media sites. 
The most direct forms of governmental response, however, are more 
aggressive. At the low end of this spectrum is the deliberate slowing down 
of connection speeds, particularly in newspaper offices, internet cafés, 
private residents, and hotels. At the other end of the spectrum is the 
complete shutdown of national networks. This tactic was employed by the 
Mubarak regime in Egypt. It was also used in Syria, where the Internet is 
almost exclusively controlled by state-owned Syrian Telecom 
Establishment. In June 2011, nearly all Internet networks in Syria were shut 
down, with the exception of a handful controlled by the Bashar Al-Assad 
regime.59 
In the middle of the spectrum of governmental response is Internet 
surveillance, legal action by the state (including arrest and formal 
prosecution), imprisonment and even torture. Internet surveillance often 
includes monitoring what information people are accessing, their online 
communications such as emails or tweets, and even using geo-location 
features on sites like Facebook to track the location of a given user. 
Organizing protests and mobilizing dissenting voices becomes increasingly 
difficult when the organizers are living in fear of spies, arrest, or physical 
attack. 
The Egyptian governmental response to social media activism during the 
Arab Spring is an example of escalating response, as the Mubarak regime 
first moved to attack and limit first the content and then the social 
networking platforms themselves before ultimately moving against the 
communications infrastructure itself. All the while, the Egyptian 
government simultaneously was employing social media platforms for its 
own purposes. As one scholar has noted, this strategy had the effect of 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater, because the full quarantine and 
shutdown of media infrastructures helped turn the tide of public opinion 
against the Mubarak regime. This quarantine strategy, notes Alexandra 
Dunn, “required a disproportionate attack on apolitical actors and was 
ultimately ineffective at fully impeding the communications networks of 
those that were the most politically engaged.”60 
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Beginning in October 2010, the Egyptian government’s response to the 
growing unrest with the ruling party was to focus its attack on content. This 
began with the shuttering of fourteen predominantly religious satellite 
television stations, the firing of four prominent critics of the Mubarak 
regime from their posts at newspapers and television talk shows, and the 
requirement that all live talk shows be broadcast from the headquarters of 
Egyptian State television.61 On the day of the parliamentary elections 
themselves, the regime blocked websites that hosted the newspapers of 
major opposition groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.62 However, this 
blockage was both focused in nature and limited in time (the government 
lifted the blockage immediately after the elections). Clearly, at this point, 
the regime was seeking to keep specific information from reaching the 
population at a specific time. 
However, by January 2011, in the face of mounting unrest, the regime’s 
efforts shifted to blocking entire platforms such as Facebook (which boasted 
3.5 million users in Egypt) and Twitter (which had 12,000 users in Egypt). 
Another site, Bambuser, had 15,000 registered users in Egypt (most of 
which signed up just before the November election). A video-sharing site, 
Bambuser enabled live broadcasts from protests, and allowed people all 
around the country to follow protests and ensuing government crackdowns 
in real time.63 With the escalating signs of social media’s importance in 
coordinating protests (the phenomenal popularity of the “We are all Khaled 
Said” Facebook page, the use of Twitter to coordinate marches), the 
Egyptian government shut down Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
networking sites in their entirety on January 25, 2011. 
As previously noted, the ubiquity of cell phones in Egypt made such 
technology an important organizing tool for activists. Along with the 
disruption of service of Facebook and Twitter, the government also targeted 
specific activists by cutting off their mobile phone lines, such as the 
Frontline SMS hotline for the group Front to Defend Egyptian Protestors 
(FDEP). However, activists responded by simply purchasing new SIM cards 
for their phones, or, in the case of FDEP, replacing the phone numbers 
multiple times. Ultimately, however, the Mubarak regime realized that more 
extreme measures would be needed in order to slow the flow of information 
that was helping to fuel and coordinate the protests. On January 27, 2011, 
the government shut down text messaging and almost all Internet service 
(with the exception of one small internet service provider, Noor ISP, which 
was not shut down until January 30, 2011.64 Internet service would not be 
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restored until February 2, and text messaging services remained frozen until 
February 6, 2011. This amounted to the most drastic attack ever taken by a 
government against national-level media technologies.65 
The Internet and SMS shutdown, however, backfired. First, the 
consequences of the media blackout could still be circumvented. The 
blocking of Twitter prompted activist to use circumvention software to 
access it, and when the Internet was shut down entirely, people used 
landlines to call friends outside the country and have them tweet for them. 
Satellite television stations showed tweets on air, and even provided 
telephone numbers for access to Google’s newly-developed Speak2Tweet 
system. But most importantly, shutting down the Internet and text-
messaging had an immediate impact beyond politics, particularly among 
business people and the wealthiest, most highly-educated segments of 
Egyptian society. As Dunn described it: 
For the vast majority of Egyptians without Internet access or satellite 
television services, the SMS shutdown was their first experience with 
government-imposed limitations on their ability to communicate openly. 
For nonpolitical individuals, the shutdown of SMS services likely came as 
a surprise, and it increased people’s engagement in the uprising, if only 
due to curiosity about the unavailable services.66 
The Mubarak regime inadvertently brought people together by 
“unplugging” the Internet. By this unplugging, Egypt inflicted potentially 
catastrophic collateral damage on itself: it “unplugged” its own economy, 
lost credibility with the international community, and showed international 
corporations, who were doing business in Egypt, such as Vodaphone, that 
like Egyptian citizens they, too, were subject to the whims and the will of 
the regime. Ultimately, even this extreme demonstration of the lengths to 
which the Mubarak regime was willing to go in order to quell dissent was 
not enough to keep the regime in power. 
Along with orchestrated attacks on international journalists, the extreme 
measures taken by Egypt to attack media infrastructure and media freedoms 
also had the byproduct of increasing diplomatic pressures, particularly by 
the United States. With the United States’ long-standing interest in 
cherished media freedoms, it came as no surprise that the media blackout 
would bring political fallout from Egypt’s single largest source of foreign 
aid. Then-Assistant Secretary of State P.J. Crowley tweeted “we are 
concerned that communication services, including the Internet, social 
media, and even this #tweet, are being blocked in #Egypt.”67 
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Yet one cannot ignore the fact that even as Western diplomats and media 
outlets condemned the extreme and often brutal efforts to curb expression 
and dissent during the Arab Spring, Western technology has been complicit 
in such crackdowns. Innovations from Western countries have enabled 
oppressive regimes in the Middle East to conduct surveillance and intercept 
the email, text messages, and cell phone calls of political dissidents. Even as 
protesters in the Middle East were using social media to organize and 
communicate, the very regimes they were battling were often equipped with 
highly-sophisticated technology, purchased from or produced by Western 
companies that they used to thwart such efforts. In a thought-provoking 
series of articles entitled “Wired for Repression,” Bloomberg News 
journalists shed light on these dealings. For example, an Iranian engineer 
who had become involved in the opposition movement in the wake of the 
2009 elections was arrested, beaten, and jailed for 52 days.68 During that 
time, he was repeatedly interrogated, with security agents confronting him 
with transcripts of text messages, geo-location records that showed where 
he had been at specific times, and even a diagram showing all of the people 
he had called, and the contacts that they in turn had called.69 The cruel irony 
was that this engineer, who had worked for telecommunications giant 
Ericsson in Tehran until 2010, had worked on some of the very technology 
that was now being used against him.70 
In addition to Ericsson technology being sold to Iran, Creativity 
Software of the United Kingdom sold systems to both Iran and Yemen 
designed to aid in customer location. The systems, which can record a 
person’s location every 15 seconds, generate reports of a person’s 
movements, and alert the user when two targets come in close proximity to 
each other, were intended for law enforcement use.71 Dublin-based Adaptive 
Mobile Security Ltd. also sold software intended for law enforcement 
purposes to Iran, technology, which would be used to monitor the text 
messaging of suspected dissidents. The system would analyze all messages 
in English, Persian, or Arabic for key words or phrases; store the messages; 
and flag ones that had been selected by a filter for review.72 Even more 
troubling than the capability for these features to be misused to quash 
dissenters is the fact that Iranian law enforcement officials requested other 
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specific features, one of which was the ability to change the content of 
messages.73 
U.S. companies, of course, have long been banned from nearly all trade 
with Iran. Moreover, in July 2010, President Obama signed new U.S. 
sanctions into law, barring federal agencies from doing business with 
companies that export to Iran “any technology specifically used to disrupt, 
monitor or restrict the speech of Iranians.”74 Despite this, U.S. technology 
still winds up in the hands of authoritarian regimes. For example, Blue Coat 
Systems, and NetApp Inc., both from Sunnyvale, California, purportedly 
developed and sold filtering technology to Tunisia that the Ben Ali regime 
used to censor websites critical of the government.75 Tunisia also used 
Smartfilter, a product from Santa Clara, California-based McAfee Inc., for 
its internet surveillance and web-blocking efforts.76 Prior to the fall of the 
Ben Ali government, Tunisian bloggers and other activists lived in an 
Orwellian existence in which a “Big Brother” type of message —“Ammar 
404”—would appear instead of the blocked websites they were trying to 
access, just as words, random symbols, or threatening messages like “you 
can run but you can’t hide” would appear instead of the emails they were 
trying to exchange with friends.77 One opponent of the Ben Ali regime, 
Asma Hedi Nairi, described how the “Ammar 404” intrusions forced her to 
shut down multiple email accounts prior to the Arab Spring, and how the 
government interference would sometimes even harm reputations by 
inserting pornographic images in work emails and by routing embarrassing 
photos onto Facebook.78 Nairi says that “Ammar 404 was seeing everything. 
Ammar 404 is more dangerous than any police man in the street. It was a 
war of information.”79 
The digital surveillance industry is worth an estimated $3 billion to $5 
billion a year.80 Just as activists during the Arab Spring and throughout the 
Middle East have used emerging technologies and social networking 
platforms to organize protests, mobilize support, and communicate with 
others, repressive regimes have used technology to intrude into and disrupt 
these digital connections. Marietje Schaake, a member of the European 
Parliament who follows the abuses of communications technology, points 
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out that “[w]e have to acknowledge that certain software products now are 
actually as effective as weapons.”81 Regimes like the Bashar Al-Assad 
government in Syria have made widespread use of these digital weapons. 
Using Western technology from companies like Nokia Siemens and others, 
the Syrian regime monitors emails and online traffic. A storage and archival 
system copies the emails, scanning across a network and stores them in a 
searchable database where the authorities can perform searches at a later 
date. 
Efforts have been made to stop the sale of such surveillance technologies 
to repressive regimes. Last year, U.S. Representative Christopher Smith of 
New Jersey, introduced the Global Online Freedom Act, which would 
create a legally-enforceable obligation on the part of any U.S. business that 
“creates, provides, or offers to the public for commercial purposes an 
internet search engine, internet communications services, or internet content 
hosting services” to ensure that the foreign countries in which it operates or 
provides service are not violating the basic human rights of their citizens to 
freely express themselves.82 The Act’s stated purpose is threefold: (1) to 
prevent American businesses from cooperating with repressive governments 
in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance; (2) to 
fulfill the responsibility of the U.S. government to promote freedom of 
expression on the Internet; and (3) to restore public confidence in the 
integrity of U.S. businesses.83 As justification for its goals, the Act notes 
that U.S.-based technology companies have enabled or even assisted 
oppressive practices of governments by supplying them with necessary 
technology and/or training.84 It also decries the cooperation by U.S. 
businesses with repressive governments by providing these regimes with 
information about their users. The bill also proposes an in-depth study of the 
feasibility of devolving expert controls concerning items being exported to 
an Internet-restricting country “for the purpose, in whole or in part, of 
facilitating substantial restrictions on internet freedom.”85 Should the study 
indicate that such controls are viable, the Act could potentially be revised to 
include them, something that could significantly impact U.S. diplomatic 
relations with a country subjected to such controls. Finally, the bill would 
also establish an “Office of Global Internet Freedom,” as a suborganization 
within the State Department.86 
While the Global Online Freedom Act is to be applauded as a market-
based approach to what is, fundamentally, a human rights problem, it raises 
as many questions as it answers. How will U.S. companies, already dealing 
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with a patchwork quilt of data privacy issues at home and abroad, react to 
being pressed into service as a sort of global police force, providing 
intelligence on the practices of the “Internet restricting” countries where 
they operate? Moreover, if violating nations wind up subject to trade 
controls, will that prompt retaliation against the United States through trade 
restriction of their own? Finally, the Act is silent on the question of solving 
the very practical issue of circumventing the letter and spirit of the Act 
through the use of “middle man” companies. Certain foreign regimes that 
are already subject to scrutiny, like Iran, have a long history of acquiring 
technology through such roundabout means. 
CONCLUSION 
Have iPads and iPhones become the protest signs and placards of the 21st 
century? A glance at political upheaval worldwide during the digital age—
from anti-Putin demonstrators in Moscow holding their tablets and 
smartphones over their heads during protests to the demonstrations in Tahrir 
Square at the height of the Arab Spring—illustrates that, contrary to 
Malcolm Gladwell’s denials, the revolution will indeed be tweeted. In the 
modern age, no social or political protest is complete without the requisite 
electronic accessories: a fast-trending hashtag (#) on Twitter that concisely 
describes the movement itself and provides updates on escalating 
developments; a critical mass of Twitter users adding momentum with their 
masses of followers and re-tweeters; and a Facebook page with thousands of 
“friends” sharing and posting. While the critics who were quick to counter 
the social media narrative that enthralled many Western journalists correctly 
pointed out that revolutions were occurring long before the advent of 
Facebook and Twitter, the fact remains that social media platforms and 
technology in general enabled protests to spread more quickly and 
organization to occur more efficiently. Facebook, Twitter, and the Internet 
may not have ignited the upheavals of the Arab Spring, but they certainly 
served as an accelerant. These new technologies may not have made history 
happen—the simmering resentments formed by decades of tyranny did 
that—but they did make history happen faster. The empirical studies of the 
role of technology during the Arab Spring bear this out. 
At the same time, the flipside of technology cannot be ignored, as the 
governmental response of “unplugging democracy” makes use of the very 
same innovations to monitor and stifle expression. Governments like the 
Mubarak regime simultaneously feared the impact that electronic content 
could have on their entrenched positions and used technology to further 
their repressive aims, ultimately (and unsuccessfully) playing the ultimate 
trump card of cutting off internet access altogether. Moreover, such a state 
media strategy provides a cautionary tale, even to countries as justifiably 
proud of their commitment to free speech as the United Kingdom and the 
United States. During the London riots of 2011, Prime Minister David 
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Cameron contemplated cutting off access to the Internet. And in San 
Francisco in August 2011, city mass transit administrators worried about 
planned protests at a number of subway stations elected to shut down 
network access, ostensibly to ensure safety. Although measures like the 
Global Online Freedom Act represent an important recognition of the role 
that U.S. businesses can inadvertently play in supporting the cyber 
surveillance efforts of repressive regimes, threats to free expression can 
originate from the highest levels of government. For the Mubarak regime at 
least, the last-ditch governmental efforts to quell unrest by “unplugging” the 
Internet failed miserably. 
 
 
 
